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1Summary
We study an economy where there are two types of assets. Consumers'
promises are the primitive defaultable assets secured by collateral chosen by
the consumers themselves. The purchase of these personalized assets by ¯-
nancial intermediaries is ¯nanced by selling back derivatives to consumers.
We show that nonarbitrage prices of primitive assets are strict submartin-
gales, whereas nonarbitrage prices of derivatives are supermartingales. Next
we establish existence of equilibrium, without imposing bounds on short sales.
The nonconvexity of the budget set is overcome by considering a continuum
of agents.
Keywords: Endogenous Collateral; Non Arbitrage.
21 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Housing mortgages stand out as the most clear and most common case
of collateralized loans. In the past, these mortgages were entirely ¯nanced
by commercial banks who had to face a serious adverse selection problem in
addition of the risks associated with concentrating investments in the hous-
ing sector. More recently, banks have managed to pass these risks to other
investors. The collateralized mortgage obligations (C.M.O.) developped in
the eighties and nineties are an example of a mechanism of spreading risks
of investing in the housing market. These obligations are derivatives backed
by a big pool of mortgages which was split into di®erent contingent °ows.
Collateralized loans were ¯rst addressed in a general equilibrium setting
by Dubey, Geanakoplos and Zame [9]. Collateral was modelled by these au-
thors as a bundle of durable goods, purchased by a borrower at the time
assets are sold and surrendered to the creditor in case of default. Clearly, in
the absence of other default penalties, in each state of nature, a debtor will
honor this commitments only when the debt does not exceed the value of the
collateral. Similarly, each creditor should expect to receive the minimum be-
tween his claim and the value of the collateral. This pionnering work studied
a two-period incomplete markets model with default and exogenous collat-
eral coe±cients and discussed also the endogenization of these coe±cients,
allowing for some coe±cients to prevail in equilibrium, out of a possible ¯nite
set of strictly positive values, but for a ¯xed composition in terms of durable
goods. Araujo, P¶ ascoa and Torres-Martinez [5] extended the exogenous col-
lateral model to in¯nite horizon economies with one-period assets and showed
that Ponzi schemes can be avoided without imposing transversality or debt
constraints.
Araujo, Orrillo and P¶ ascoa [3] studied existence of equilibria in an econ-
omy where borrowers may choose collateral bundles under the restriction
that the value of the collateral, per unit of asset and at the time when it is
constituted, must exceed the asset price by some arbitrarily small amount
exogenously ¯xed. Under this requirement the loan can only ¯nance up to
some certain fraction of the value of the house. Lenders were assumed not
3to trade directly with individual borrowers, but rather to buy obligations
backed by a weighted average of the collaterals chosen by individual borrow-
ers, with the individual sales serving as weights. Borrowers sell at di®erent
prices depending on the collateral choice, as there is a spread which is a dis-
counted expectation of default given in the future. Hence, borrowers choose
the composition of the collateral in terms of durable goods and the collateral
margin (which is not necessarily equal to the exogenous lower bound as more
collateral reduces the spread).
However, the model su®ered from three important drawbacks that we try
to overcome in the current paper. First, short sales were bounded due to
the above exogenous lower bound on the di®erence between the value of the
collateral and the asset price ( in fact, ¯rst period budget feasibility implies
that short sales must be bounded by the upper bound on endowments di-
vided by the exogenously ¯xed lower bound on the di®erence between the
value of the collateral and the asset price). It is hard to accept the existence
of an exogenous uniform upper bound on the fraction of the value the house
that can be ¯nanced by a loan.
Secondly, the payo®s of the derivative were constructed in a way that im-
plied that in equilibrium, in each state of nature, either all borrowers would
honor their debts or all borrowers would default (even though the collateral
bundle might vary across borrower). In fact, derivative's payo®s were as-
sumed to be the minimum between the debt and the value of the depreciated
weighted average of all collateral bundles. If we require, as we do in this
paper, that the derivative's payo® in each state is just the weighted average
of borrowers' repayments (which may be the full repayment of the debt for
some borrowers or the value of the depreciated personalized collateral for
others), then, in equilibrium, some borrowers may default while others will
pay back their loans.
Third, derivative aggregate purchases were required to match, in units,
aggregate short-sales of primitive assets, but this equality should only be
required in value. That is, each ¯nancial intermediary should be ¯nancing the
purchase of the consumers' promises on a certain primitive asset by issuing
the respective derivative, thereby making zero pro¯t at the initial date (and
also at any future state of nature due to the above requirement that the
4derivative's endogenous payo® should be the weighted average of consumers'
e®ective repayments).
1.2 Results and Methodology
It is well known that in incomplete markets with real assets equilibrium
might not exist without the presence of a bounded short sales condition
(see Hart [14] for a counter-example and Du±e and Shafer [10] on generic
existence). In a model with exogenous collateral this bounded short sales
condition does not need to be imposed arbitrarily but it follows from the
fact that collateral must be constituted at the exogenously given coe±cients.
An important question is whether existence of equilibria may dispense any
bounded short sales conditions in a model with endogenous collateral. The
fact that the borrower holds and consumes the collateral discourages him
from choosing the collateral so low that default would become a sure event.
To be more precise, the borrower should always provide enough collateral
so that its depreciated value matches the promised payment in at least one
state. Otherwise, the borrower's utility could be increased by raising the
collateral without changing net returns and by making the reduced default
spread cancel out the increased collateral costs. If equilibrium levels of the
collateral coe±cients are bounded away from zero, then equilibrium aggre-
gate short sales are bounded.
Allowing borrowers to choose their collateral bundles introduces a non-
convexity in the budget set, which is overcome by considering a continuum
of agents. This large agents set is actually a nice set up both for the huge
pooling of individual mortgages and for the spreading of risks across many
investors. However, for a continuum of agents, having established that ag-
gregate short sales are endogenously bounded does not imply that the short
sales allocation is uniformly bounded. But if it were not, short sale prices,
net of collateral costs, would not be uniformly bounded away from zero and
all agents would respond by choosing low margins and arbitrarily large short
sales, contradicting the already established bounded aggregated short sales.
Then, short sales allocations are endogenously uniformly bounded, as de-
sired to prove existence using a multi-dimensional version of Fatou's lemma
applied to a sequence of equilibria of truncated auxiliary economies whose
bundles and portfolios are bounded.
51.3 Arbitrage and Pricing
The existence argument uses a pricing formula suggested by a study of
the nonarbitrage conditions for asset pricing in the context of a model where
purchases of the collateralized derivatives and sales of individual assets yield
di®erent returns. This nonarbitrage analysis was absent in the earlier work
by Araujo, Orrillo and P¶ ascoa [3], where budget feasible short sales were
bounded.
Our analysis of the nonarbitrage conditions is close to the study made by
Jouini and Kallal [16] in the presence of short sales constraints. In fact, the
individual promises of homeowners are assets that can not be bought by these
agents and the collateralized derivatives bought by investors is an asset that
can not be short sold by these agents. These sign constraints determine that
purchase prices of the the collateralized derivatives follow supermartingales,
whereas sale prices of homeowners promises follow submartingales. Actually,
the latter must be strict submartingale when collateral is consumed by bor-
rowers, since short sales generate utility returns also, and in this respect, our
analysis di®ers from Jouini and Kallal [16].
The nonarbitrage conditions identify several components in the price of
a consumer's promise: a base price common to all consumers, a spread that
depends on the future default, a positive term re°ecting the di®erence be-
tween current and future collateral values, a nonnegative tail due to the sign
constraints and a negative tail on the sale price due to utility returns from
consumption of the collateral. We also show that the price of the minimal
cost superhedging strategy is the supremum over all discounted expectations
of the claim, with respect to every underlying probability measure (and sim-
ilarly, the price of a maximal revenue subhedging strategy is instead the in-
¯mum over those expectations, in the spirit of the Cvitanic and Karatzas [7]
and El Karoui and Quenez [12] approaches to pricing in incomplete markets).
In equilibrium agents will face price functions, as in Araujo, Orrillo and
P¶ ascoa [3], rather than price vectors. More precisely, we propose price for-
mulas both for the primitive assets and the derivatives which are suggested
by our arbitrage analysis. The state prices entering in these equilibrium price
functions and the negative tail of the primitive asset prices are both taken
6as given and common to all agents. That is, equilibrium prices of deriva-
tive or primitive assets are given by super or sub martingales, respectively,
with respect to a common measure, but can also be written as super or sub
martingales for consumer speci¯c measures implied by the personal choice of
collateral and e®ective returns (namely using the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers as
de°ators).
1.4 Relation to Other Equilibrium Concepts
We close the paper with a discussion of the e±ciency properties of equi-
libria. We show that an equilibrium allocation is undominated by alloca-
tions that are feasible and provide income across states through the same
given equilibrium spot prices, although may be ¯nanced in the ¯rst period
in any other way (possibly through transfers across individuals). This re-
sults extends usual constrained e±ciency results to the case of default and
endogenous collateral. An implication is that the no-default equilibrium, the
exogenous collateral equilibrium or even the endogenous collateral equilib-
rium with bounded short sales are concepts imposing further restrictions on
the welfare problem and should be expected to be dominated by the proposed
equilibrium concept.
In this paper we simplify the mixing of individual promises by assuming
that each collateralized derivative mixes the promises of all sellers of a certain
primitive asset. Since the collateral choice personalizes the asset the result-
ing derivative represents already a signi¯cative mixing across assets with
rather di®erent default pro¯les. Further work should address the composi-
tion of derivatives from di®erent primitive assets and certain chosen subsets
of debtors. We do not deal also with the case of default penalties entering the
utility function and the resulting adverse selection problems. The penalty
model was extensively studied by Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik [8], ex-
tended to a continuum of states and in¯nite horizon by Araujo, Monteiro and
P¶ ascoa [1, 2] and combined with the collateral model by Dubey, Geanakoplos
and Zame [9]. Our default model di®ers also from the bankruptcy models
where agents do not honor their debts only when they have no means to
pay them, or more precisely, when the entire ¯nancial debt exceeds the value
of the endowments that creditors are entitled to con¯scate (see Araujo and
P¶ ascoa [4]).
7The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model
of default and collateral choice. Sections 3 and 4 address arbitrage and
pricing. Section 5 presents the de¯nition of equilibrium and the existence
result. Section 6 contains the existence proof and Section 7 discusses the
e±ciency properties. A mathematical appendix contains some results used
in the existence proof.
2 Model of Default and Collateral Choice
We consider an economy with two periods and a ¯nite number S of states
of nature in the second period. There are L physical durable commodities
traded in the market and J real assets that are traded in the initial period
and yield returns in the second period. These returns are represented by a
random variable R : S 7! I RJL
+ such that the returns from each asset are not
trivially zero, that is , Rsj > neq0 8s;j. In this economy each sale of asset j
(promise) must be backed by collateral. This collateral will consist of goods
that depreciate at some rate Ys depending on the state of nature s 2 S that
occurs in the second period.
Each seller of assets chooses also the collateral coe±cient for the di®erent
assets that he sells and we suppose that the mean collateral coe±cients can
be known by consumers. For each asset j denote by Mj 2 I RL
+ the choice
of collateral coe±cients. The mean collateral coe±cients will be denoted by
C 2 I R
JL
+ . Each agent in the economy is a small investor whose portfolio is




+ , where the ¯rst and second components are the purchase
of the derivative and sale of the primitive assets, respectively. The collateral
bundle choosen by borrower will be M' and his whole ¯rst period consump-
tion bundle is xo + M'.
Denote by xs 2 I Rl
+ the consumption vector in state of nature s. Agent¶s
endowments are denoted by ! 2 I R
(S+1)L
++ . Let ¼1 and ¼2 be the vectors
of purchase prices of the derivatives and of sale prices of primitive assets,
respectively. Then, the budget constraints of each agent will be the following










psYsMj'j + psYsxo; 8s 2 S (2)
Here Dsj ´ minfpsRj
s;psYsMjg and Nsj are what he will paid and received
with the sale and purchase of one unit of the primitive asset j and one unit
of its derivative, respectively. Now we will represent equations (1) and (2) in
matrix form:
p 2(~ x ¡ !) · A(xo;µ;') (3)
where ~ x = (0;x1;:::;xS), ! = (!o;!1;:::;!S), p 2(~ x ¡ !) is the column










¡po ¡¼1 ¼2 ¡ poM
p1Y1 N1 p1Y1M ¡ D1
p2Y2 N2 p2Y2M ¡ D2
¢ ¢ ¢
¢ ¢ ¢









3 Arbitrage and Collateral
Now we will de¯ne arbitrage in our context where both sales of collateral-
ized assets and additional purchases of durable goods have utility returns that
have to be taken into account together with pecuniary returns. Moreover,
agents' preferences are assumed to be monotonic.
De¯nition 1 We say that there exist arbitrage opportunities if
9 Mj > 0; j = 1;::;J; µ ¸ 0 and (xo;') such that










Notice that even when there are no pecuniary net returns and zero net cost
the agent may still gain from the utility returns of consuming durable goods,
serving or not as collateral, that is, through a collateralized short sale ('j >
0) or a non ¯nanced purchase (xo > 0).
9Theorem 1 There are no arbitrage opportunities if and only if there exists
¯ 2 I R
S
































Let B = fT(xo;µ;') : µ ¸ 0g and ~ B = fT(xo;µ;') : µ = 0g, which are a




Absence arbitrage is equivalent to K \ B = f0g. By the theorem of sep-
aration of convex cones, we have that K \ B = f0g if and only if 9f 6= 0
linear: f(z) < f(y); 8z 2 B;y 2 Knf0g.
Now f(z) = 0; 8z 2 ~ B, since ~ B is a linear subspace. Then f(y) >
0; 8y 2 Knf0g and it follows that f(z) · 0 8z 2 B. Hence 9 (~ ®; ~ ¯; ~ ¹; ~ ´) >>
0 : f(v;c;xo;') = ~ ® + ~ ¯c + ~ ¹xo + ~ ´' · 0; 8(v;c;xo;') 2 B. Take
¯ = ~ ¯=®; ¹ = ~ ¹=® and ´ = ~ ´=®, and we have (5) when (xo;') = 0. To











¯spsYs + ¹: ¥
Comment
Durable goods prices (p0) and net prices (p0Mj¡¼
j
2) of the joint operation of
constituting collateral and short-selling a primitive asset are both superlinear
functions of pecuniary returns, by the Theorem above, due to the additional




2 > 0 when Mj 6= 0; 8j
Since short-sales lead to nonnegative net yields in the second period (once
we add the depreciated collateral to returns) and also to consumption of the
collateral bundle in the ¯rst period, nonarbitrage requires the net coe±cient
of short-sales in the ¯rst period budget constraint to be positive.
If we had considered the collateral as being exogenous, we would have
the following result:
Corollary 2 There are no arbitrage opportunities if and only if there exists

















¯spsYs)Cj > 0; and poCj ¡ ¼
j > 0; 8j 2 J:
For more details on the implications of the absence of arbitrage in the
exogenous collateral model see Fajardo [13].
In contrast with the fundamental theorem of asset pricing in frictionless
¯nancial markets, we can obtain an alternative result for the default model
with collateral where discounted nonarbitrage asset prices are no longer mar-
tingales with respect to some equivalent probability measure. This result is
presented in the next section.
4 Pricing
4.1 A Pricing Theorem
Let I R be the real line and I R = I R [ f¡1;+1g the extended real line.
Let ­ = f1;2;::;Sg, (­;F;P) be a probability space and X = I R
S. We say
11that f : X 7! I R is a positive linear functional if 8 x 2 X+; f(x) > 0, where
X+ = fx 2 X/P(x ¸ 0) = 1 and P(x > 0) > 0g. The next result follows





2 ¡ poMj < 0; 8j which will be refered to as the net sell price
and let Dsj = Dsj ¡ psYsMj; 8j and 8s.
Denote by ¶(x) the smallest amount necessary to get at least the payo®
x for sure by trading in the underlying defaultable assets. Then no investor
is willing to pay more than ¶(x) for the contingent claim x. The speci¯c
expression for ¶ is given by
¶(x) = inf
(µ;')2£
f¼1µ ¡ ¼2' > 0
.








Theorem 2 i) There are no arbitrage opportunities if and only if there
exist probabilities ¯¤
s; s = 1;::;S equivalent to P and a positive ° such
that the normalized (by °) purchase prices of the derivatives are super-
martingales and the normalized (by °) net sale prices of the primitive
assets are submartingales under this probability. when the collateral is
consumed by the borrower, the net sale price is a strict submartingale
ii) Let Q¤ be the set of ¯¤ obtained in (i) and ¡ be the set of positive linear
functionals » such that »jM · ¶, where M is a convex cone representing
the set of marketed claims. Then there is a one-to-one correspondence













where E¤ is the expectation taken with respect to ¯¤









(i) Let ¯o =
PS
s=1 ¯s and ¯¤
s =
¯s







































2 ¡ p0Mj are super and sub martingales, respectively.
Now, if there is a probability measure and a process ° such the nor-













· °[¼1µ ¡ ¼2']
Then there can not exists arbitrage opportunities.












it is a continuous linear functional. Since ¯¤ is equivalent to P and














· °[¼1µ ¡ ¼2']
we have » 2 ¡.
Now take » 2 ¡ and de¯ne ¯¤(B) =
PS
s=1 ¯¤
s1B(s) = »(1B). Since S is
13¯nite, ¯¤ is equivalent to P.
Now since »(1S) = 1, we have ¯¤(S) = 1 =
PS
s=1 ¯¤
s, so ¯¤ is a proba-
bility.
(iii) By part (ii) take a » 2 ¡ then 8x 2 M
»(x) · ¶(x) ) ¡»(¡x) · ¶(x)
then replacing x by ¡x we have
»(x) ¸ ¡¶(¡x)
Hence
clf»(x)=» 2 ¡g ½ [¡¶(¡x);¶(x)]
For the converse, ¡¶(¡x) = ¶(x) the proof is trivial. Then we suppose
that ¡¶(¡x) < ¶(x). Now it is easy to see that ¶ is l.s.c. and sublinear.
Then the set K = f(x;¸) 2 M £ I R : ¸ ¸ ¶(x)g is a closed convex
cone. Hence 8² > 0 we have that (x;¶(x) ¡ ²) = 2 K. Applying the
strict separation theorem we obtain that there exist a vector Á and
there exists real number ® such thatÁ¢(x;¶(x)¡²) < ® and Á¢(x;¸) >
® 8(x;¸) 2 K. Then we can rewrite these inequalities as:
Áo ¢ x + ÁS+1(¶(x) ¡ ²) < ®
Áo ¢ x + ÁS+1¸ > ® 8(x;¸) 2 K
where Áo = (Á1;:::;ÁS) and, since K is a convex cone, we must have
® < 0. This implies Áo ¢ x + ÁS+1(¶(x) ¡ ²) < 0 and Áo ¢ x + ÁS+1¸ ¸
0 8(x;¸) 2 K. Hence ÁS+1 > 0 and we can de¯ne º(x) = ¡
Áo
ÁS+1 ¢ x.
It is easy to see that º is a continuous linear functional and º(x) ·
¶(x); 8x 2 M, since (x;¶(x)) 2 K. Also º(x) > ¶(x) ¡ ². Now for all
x 2 X+, we have º(¡x) · ¶(¡x) · 0, so º(x) ¸ 0. With an analoguous
argument, we obtain º0(x) 2 ¡ such that º0jM · ¶ and
¡¶(¡x) · º
0(x) · ¡¶(¡x) + ²
Since fº 2 ¥=ºjM · ¶g is a convex set and fº(x)=ºjM · ¶ ; º 2 ¡g is
an interval we obtain the inclusion.¥
14Remark
² Our de¯nition of maximal willingness to pay ¶(x) is in the spirit of the
super replication approach of El Karoui and Quenez [12] and Cvitani¶ c
and Karatzas [7] to pricing in incomplete markets. We consider as su-
perhedging strategies the defaultable assets.
Theorem 2, (ii) establishes a one to one correspondence between linear
pricing rules, bounded from above by ¶(x), and measures ¯¤, considered
in the sub and supermartingale pricing formulas














In this section borrowers (sellers of assets) will choose the collateral coe±-
cients. We assume that there is a continuum of agents H = [0;1] modeled by
the Lebesgue probability space (H;B;¸). Each agent h is characterized by
his endowments !h and his utility Uh. Each agent sells in the initial period
J assets that will be backed by a chosen collateral bundle and purchases also
the derivatives; in the second period will receive the respective returns.
The allocation of the commodities is an integrable map x : H ! I R
(S+1)L
+ .
The derivative purchase and primitive assets short sale allocations are rep-
resented by two integral maps; µ : H ! I R
J
+ and ' : H ! I R
J
+, respectively.
Each borrower h will choose the collateral coe±cients for each portfolio sold
.The allocation of collateral coe±cients chosen by borrowers is described by
the function M : H ! I R
J
+.
Consumers short-sell and collateralize the primitive assets but can only
buy a derivative issued by a ¯nancial intermediary that buys the primitive
assets. The value of the derivative's aggregate purchases must match the
value of the primitive asset's aggregate short-sales (and the value of the ag-
gregate respective returns should also be equal in any state of nature in the
15future). Each buyer of assets (lender) will take as given the derivatives' pay-
o®s Nsj and a mean collateral coe±cients vector C 2 I RJL




S) be the commodity consumption in the several states of
the world in the second period.
Sale prices of primitive assets are assumed to consist of a base price
minus a discounted expected value of future default plus a term re°ecting the
collateral requirements (which entail a cost but yield a depreciated collateral
bundle) and an addicional negative tail ±j ´ ¡(p0 ¡
P
s °spsYs)Cj which is
independent of the collateral choice. More speci¯cally we assume




+ + (po ¡
X
s
°spsYs)(Mj ¡ Cj) (8)
The state prices °s are common to all agents and taken as given together
with the base price q. The vector of prices for the collateralized derivatives,
whose returns are given by Ns, is ¼1j. We will show that for an asset j which
is traded we have qj =
P


















(x;µ;';M) 2 I R
L(S+1)+2J+JL : (1) and (2) hold for
¼2 given by (8)g


























































































² Equations (10) and (11) are the usual market clearing conditions. Equa-
tion (12) says that in equilibrium the anonymous collateral coe±cient
Cj is anticipated as the weighted average of the collateral coe±cients
allocation Mj.
² Equation (13) says that aggregate yields of each derivative must be
equal to aggregate actual payments of the underlying primitive assets.
This implies that aggregate default su®ered must be equal to aggregate






















jdh 8s 2 S; 8j 2 J
Where Sj
s = fh 2 H : psRj
s > Nsjg is the set of agents that su®ered
default in state of nature s on asset j and Gj
s = fh 2 H : psRj
s >
psYsMh
j g is the set of agents that give default in state of nature s on
asset j. Note that Sj
s is equal to H or Á, since psRj
s and Nsj do not
depend on h.
17² The above equilibrium concept portraits equilibria in housing mort-
gages markets where individual mortgages are backed by houses and
then huge pools of mortgages are split into derivatives.
In our anonymous and abstract setting, any agent in the economy may
be simultaneously a homeowner and an investor buying a derivative.
The above equilibrium concept assumes the existence of J ¯nancial
institutions, each one buying the pool of mortgages, written on prim-
itive asset j; from consumers at prices ¼h
2j and issuing the respective
derivative, which is sold to consumers at prices ¼1j. These ¯nancial
institutions make zero pro¯ts in equilibrium both at the initial date
and at any future state of nature.
To simplify, we mix promises of di®erent sellers of a same asset but
do not mix di®erent assets into derivatives. This simpli¯cation is not
too strong, since di®erent sellers of a same asset end up selling person-
alized assets due to di®erent choices of collateral. A more elaborate
model should allow for the mix of di®erent primitive assets and for
the strategic choice of the mix of assets and debtors by the issuer of
the derivative. Putting together in a same model the price-taking con-
sumers and investments banks composing the derivatives strategically
may be a di±cult task, since the latter would have to anticipate the
Walrasian response of the former.
We will now ¯x our assumptions on preferences.
Assumption (P) : preferences are time and state separable, monotonic,
representable by smooth strictly concave utility functions uh
Theorem 3 If consumers's preferences satisfy assumption (P) and the en-
dowments allocation ! belongs to L1(H;I R
(S+1)L
++ ), then, there exist equilibria
where borrowers choose their respective collateral coe±cients.
6 Proof of the Existence Theorem
Let us ¯rst address the case where bundles and portfolios are bounded
from above. More precisely, non¯nanced consumption bundles xh, portfolios
18(µh;'h) and collateral coe±cients Mh
j are bounded by n in each coordinate.
Then we will let n go to 1.
Truncated Economy
De¯ne a sequence of truncated economies (En)n such that the budget set



















(1) and (2) hold g
We assume that C 2 [0;n]LJ. We denote by 1 the vector (1,...,1).
Generalized Game
For each n 2 N we de¯ne the following generalized game played by the
continuum of consumers and some additional atomic players. Denote this
game by Jn which is described as follows:
² Each consumer h 2 H maximizes Uh in the constrained strategy set
Bh
n(p;q;¼1;C;°):





















































19² Another ¯ctitious agent chooses ¼1j 2 [0;1];qj 2 [0;° maxs;k Rsjk];

















































This game has an equilibrium in mixed strategies (see lemma 8) and, by
Liapunov's Theorem (see lemma 9), there exists a pure strategies equilibrium.
Now let us de¯ne a free disposal equilibrium for the truncated econ-
omy as a pair consisting of a price vector (p;¼1;°;C;N) and an allocation
(x;µ;';M)H) such that (x;µ;';M)(h) maximizes consumer h's utility Uh on












































Lemma 1 For n large enough, there exists a free-disposal equilibrium for the
truncated economy.
20Proof:
Let z = (xh;µh;'h;Mh) : H ! [0;n]L(S+1)+2J+LJ, (po;q;¼1;°, ps;C) be








In fact, the equality holds trivially when
R








jdh · n and therefore Cj can be chosen in [0;n] to






2'hdh, (2) qj =
P
s °spsRsj when R
H µh
jdh 6= 0, (3)
R
H µhdh = 0 if and only if
R




jdh 6= 0 the ¯nancial intermediary sets qj =
P
s °spsRsj



























j = 0 for a.e. h but
R
H µh
jdh 6= 0, then Nj and ¼1jare set equal to
zero, implying that µh
j could be instead set equal to zero, for a.e. h, without




jdh = 0 the ¯nancial intermediary sets ° so that p0 ¸
P
s °spsYs
and makes qj =
P
s °s(psRsj ¡ psYsMj)+ implying
¼
h




Notice that this agent may not be able to make p0 =
P
s °spsYs as ° may
















s °spsYs all borrowers choose 'h
j = 0 and when p0 > P
s °spsYs all borrowers choose Mh







j = Cj. Then, ¼h

















21In fact, these inequalities hold as equalities when
R
H µh








jdh does not exceed n; for every s. Other-
wise, the strict inequalities hold in (1) for some s and in (2).¤




















o)dh · 0 (16)












o)dh · 0;8s 2 S (17)
For n larger enough, we must have pol > 0;8l 2 L. Otherwise, every con-
sumer would choose xh
ol = n and we would have contradicted (15) But when









h)l)dh = 0 8l 2 L (18)
since the aggregate budget constraint of the ¯rst period is a null sum of non
positive terms and therefore a sum of null terms. ¥





n)fh2Hg);pn;¼1n;qn;°n;Cn;Nng be the sequence
of free-disposal equilibria corresponding to En. Let n ! 1 and examine the
asymptotic properties of the sequence.
Lemma 2 pn
sl 9 0 8s;l
Proof:
Suppose pn
sl ! 0 for some (s;l). Since
R
xhn
sl dh is bounded it follows, by






cluster point. Moreover for each n there is a full measure set Fn of consumers




22which is a full measure set and take h 2 F. Passing to a subsequence if
necessary, we can take xhn
sl < n ¡ v for every n; where v = minl $h
sl , and let
b xn 2 <
L(S+1)
+ be such that b xn
sl = xhn
sl + v < n and b xn
ki = xhn
ki for (k;i) 6= (s;l).












hn) for n large enough.
Moreover, the vector (1¡ pn
sl)(b x;µhn;'hn) together with Mhn is budget fea-






s. This contradicts the optimality of
(xhn;µhn;'hn;Mhn).¥
The sequences fMhn
jl gn and fChn
jl gnadmit (maxs;k;j R
j
sk)=(mins pslYsl) as
an upper bound. In fact, any choice of collateral coe±cients beyond this
bound determines sure repayment and would be equivalent to constituting
collateral just up to this bound and consuming the remaining in the form of
a bundle not serving as collateral (that is, as part of xn
0).
Lemma 3 Cn
j 6! 0 as n ! 1. Actually, there exist uniform positive lower








j g be the set of states where agent










6= ; 8 h;j for n large enough, when asset j is traded. Otherwise,
the Kuhn-Tucker ¯rst order necessary condition in Mjl(see section 9.4 in the
appendix where the necessity is established) would become u0
ol'j · 0, which
is impossible.














each n, 8h, Mhn
j 2 T n
j and Cn
j 2 conT n
j : Notice that for n large enough
pn
sl 6= 0 and therefore 0 = 2 conT n
j . De¯ne the corresponding sets at the cluster
point (ps)S
s=1 À 0 : Tsj =
©
z 2 I Rl






must have the cluster point Cj of the sequence Cn
j belonging to conTj which
23does not contain the origin, hence Cj 6= 0. This completes the proof of lemma
3.¥
The intuition behind the claim in the above proof that consumers never
choose collateral coe±cients so low that they end up defaulting in every state
lies in the fact that, by increasing the collateral coe±cients up to the point
where the depreciated value of the collateral exactly matches the promised
payment in some state, consumers still have a zero net return, from the
joint operation of short selling and constituting collateral (as they keep on
surrending the value of the depreciated collateral), and manage to mantain
also the same net price of this joint operation as the short sale price increase
(due to reduced default spread) equals the increase in collateral costs, but
utility has meanwhile gone up as more collateral is being consumed. In fact,
let the collateral coe±cients rise from Mh1
j to Mh2
j . The short sale price ¼h
2j
is given by qj ¡
P
s °sdefsj + (p0 ¡
P
s °spsYs)(Mh
j ¡ Cj), where defsj is the
default on asset j in state s. Then, the increase in ¼h
2j is equal to p0¢Mh
j
since ¢defsj = psRsj ¡ psYsM2h
j ¡ (psRsj ¡ psYsM1h








n)dhg is a bounded sequence.
Proof:

























o)dh;8s 2 S: (19)
























oldh;8l 2 L (21)
Then, by lemma 3,
R
H 'h
njdh is bounded. ¥
24Lemma 5 The aggregate purchase of the derivative can also be taken as
bounded, along the sequence of equilibria for the truncated economies.
Proof:
Let N(n) = maxs Nn
sj and use the homogeneity of degree -1 of demand








1j=N(n) and e µhn
j = µhn
j N(n). Then, e Nn
sj has a clus-
ter point also,8s and actually, passing to a subsequence if necessary, e Nn
sj is



























j dh 9 1.
In the rest of the proof, to simplify the notation, let us take µn to be
actually the allocation e µn.¥
Lemma 6 the sequence of allocations fxn;µn;'n;Mng is uniformly bounded.
Proof:






the hypothesis of the weak version of Fatou's Lemma. Therefore 9z integrable
such that
z
h 2 clfzn(h)g for a.e h
Notice also that pn;¼1n;qn;°n have cluster points.
Claim zh ´ (xh;µh;'h;Mh) maximizes Uh at the cluster point of
(pn;qn;°n;Cn;Nn), for almost every h.
In fact, zh is budget feasible at (p;q;¼1;°;C;N) = limn!1(pn;qn;¼n
1;°n;Cn;Nn),
passing to a subsequence if necessary and consumers' optimal choice corre-
spondences are closed (see appendix).2
25Individual optimality at the cluster points implies that pn
0l 9 0 (l = 1;:::;L)l
and ¼n























Lemma 7 The short sales allocation is also uniformly bounded
Proof:




















































































































s °spsRsk + (po ¡
P
s °spsYs)Ck, for any asset k
Otherwise any agent could make poMk ¡ ¼2h
k = limn!1 an
k · 0 for Mh
k
su±cient small but di®erent from zero so that default occurs in every state
(or the payment exactly matches the value of the depreciated collateral).
26Such a choice for Mh
k would be accompanied by choosing 'k arbitrary large,
which can not occur since there is a ¯nite optimal choice znh for almost every
h (see the claim in the proof of lemma 6). 2
Now, for any asset k, b
h(n)
k ¸ 0 and, for n large enough, the above
claim implies that an





k ) > 0 for any asset








j is bounded by suph;l $h
0l. Hence '
h(n)






j ) ! 0 and therefore an




jng is uniformly bounded and, from (2), fxh
slng is also uni-
formly bounded. All these facts imply that the sequence (xn;µn;'n;Mn'n)
is uniformly bounded.
We can now continue the proof of existence of equilibria for the economy
E using the strong version of Fatou's lemma (see Appendix):
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j dh > nN(n). If N(n) < n, then the inequality would
hold as equality. If N(n) = n, then n2 R
H µhn





j dh = n
R
H µhn



















j dh ! 0, but
27the former implies the latter, since we would have ¼h
2j = p0(Mj ¡ Cj) which
would lead every agent to choose Mh
j ¸ Cj;8h, and, therefore, Mh
j = Cj,
implying that ¼h
2j = 0 and 'h





































In this section we prove that an equilibrium allocation is constrained e±-
cient among all feasible allocations that provide income across states through
the same spot prices (the given equilibrium prices). In comparison with the
equilibrium obtained by Araujo, Orrillo and P¶ ascoa [3], we can say that
our equilibrium is Pareto superior, since we are not impossing any kind of
bounded short sale.
As in the work of Magill and Shafer [18], we compare the equilibrium
allocation with one feasible allocation whose portfolios do not necessarily
result from trading competitively in asset markets. That is, in alternative
allocations agents pay participation fees which may di®er from the market
portfolio cost. Equivalently, we allow for transfers across agents which are
being added to the usual market portfolio cost.
Proposition 1 Let ((x;µ;';M);p;¼1;¼2;C;N) be an equilibrium. The al-
location (x;µ;';M) is e±cient among all allocations (x;µ;';M) for which
there are transfers T h 2 I R across agents and a vector C 2 I RJL



















































j; 8s; a:e: h
28(iii) po(xh
o + Mh'h ¡ !h
o) + ¼1µh ¡ ¼2'h + T h = 0
(iv)
R









where the equilibrium prices are given by





¼2 = q ¡
X
s
°sg2s + (po ¡
X
s





Suppose not, say (x;µ;';M;C) together with some transfer fraction T











'h;x¡o) for h in some positive measure














s = (psRs ¡ psYsM
h)
+'
h ¡ (psRs ¡ Ns)
+µ
h
= (psRs ¡ D
h
s)'
h ¡ (psRs ¡ Ns)µ
h
By continuity of preferences and monotonicity we can take G = H, without
loss of generality. Then
R
H gh



























where the right hand side is strictly positive, contradicting R
H(xh
s ¡ !h
s ¡ Ys(Mh'h + xh
o))dh = 0 .¥
29The above weak constrained e±ciency property is in the same spirit as
properties found in the incomplete markets model without default (see Magill
and Shafer [18]) and also in the exogenous collateral model (without utility
penalties) of Dubey, Geanakoplos and Zame [9]. As in these models, it does
not seem to be possible to show that equilibrium allocations are undominated
when prices are no longer assumed to be constant at the equilibrium levels.
However equilibria with default and endogenous collateral, as proposed in
this paper, is Pareto superior to the no-default equilibria, to the exogenous
collateral equilibria and even to the bounded short-sales endogenous collat-
eral equilibria of Araujo, Orrillo and P¶ ascoa [3], since our equilibria is free of
any of the constraints which are used in the de¯nition of these equilibrium
concepts (that is, absence of default, exogeneity of collateral and bounded
short-sales).
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have obtained a no arbitrage characterization of the
prices of collateralized promises, where the collateral coe±cients are choosen
by borrowers as in Ara¶ ujo, Orrillo, P¶ ascoa [3]. We also obtained a pricing
result consistent with the observation made by Jouini and Kallal [16] for
the case of short sale constraints, more precisely we have shown that our
buy and net sell prices are supermartingale and submartingales, respectively,
under some probability measures. For these probabilities we have found
lower and upper bounds for the prices of derivatives written on the primitive
defaultable assets. Finally using the nonarbitrage characterization of asset
prices we proposed an equilibrium pricing formula and showed the existence
of equilibrium in the model where borrowers choose the collateral coe±cients,
without imposing uniform bounds on short-sales (thus avoiding a drawback of




² Let C(K) the Banach space of continuous functions on the compact
metric space K. Let L1(H;C(K)) be the Banach space of Bochner in-








Let B(K) denotes the set of regular measures on the Borelians of K.
The dual space of L1(H;C(K)) is L1
! (H;B(K)), the Banach space
of essentially strong bounded weak ¤ measurable functions from H
into B(K). We say that f¹ng ½ L1(H;B(K)) converges to ¹ 2
L1

















² We will use in this work the following lemmas ( in m-dimension).
Fatou's lemma (Weak Version)
Let ffng be a sequence of integrable functions of a measure space
(­;A;º) into I R
m
+. Suppose that limn!1
R
­ fndº exists. Then there
exists an integrable function f : ­ 7! I R
m
+ such that:
1. f(w) 2 clffn(w)g for a.e w, and
2.
R
­ fdº · limn!1
R
­ fndº
Fatou's lemma (Strong version)
If in addition the sequence ffng above is uniformly integrable, then the
inequality in 2. holds as an equality.
9.2 Extended Game
We extend the generalized game by allowing for mixed strategies both in
portfolios and collateral bundles. Remember that, for each player a mixed
strategy is a probability distribution on his set of pure strategies. In this
31case the set of measures on the Borelians of Kn = [0;n]J £ [0;n]J £ [0;n]LJ.
We denote by B the set of mixed strategies of each consumer. Since we are
not interested in a mixed strategies equilibrium, per se, we will extend the
previous game to a game J n over mixed strategies ( that we call extended
game) whose equilibria: 1) exist 2) can be puri¯ed and 3) a pure version is
an equilibrium for the original game. First, before extending the game to
mixed strategies, let us rewrite the payo®s of the ¯ctitious agents replacing














satisfying (1) and (2)g
That is, function dh solves the utility maximization problem for a given
portfolio (µh;'h) and given collateral coe±cients Mh
j . By the maximum
theorem and the fact that consumers' choice correspondences are closed (see
Proposition below), dh is continuous. Secondly, we extend the payo®s to
mixed strategies.

















































h for s 2 S


































































² Another ¯ctitious agent chooses ¼1j 2 [0;1];qj 2 [0;maxs;k Rsjk];Nsj 2































































Lemma 8 J n has an equilibrium, possibly in mixed strategies over portfolio
and collateral together.
Proof:
The existence argument in Ali Khan [17] can be modi¯ed to allow for some
atomic players. First, by the Proposition below, consumers' pure strategies
choice correspondences are closed, and therefore, upper semicontinuous in
the truncated economy. Now, mixed strategies choice correspondences are
the closed convex hull of the pure strategies choice correspondences and,
therefore, will be also upper semicontinuous.
Now, de¯ne the correspondence:
®(p;¼;C) = ff ´ (x;¹) 2 ([0;n]
L(S+1) £ B)
H : f(h) 2 º
h(p;¼;C)g
Which is also convex valued and upper semicontinuous . The best re-
sponse correspondences Ri of the r = S + 2 + JL ¯ctitious agents are con-
vex valued and upper semicontinuous on the pro¯le of consumers' proba-
bility measures on Kn (with respect to the weak * topology on the dual of
L1(H;C(Kn) ). The pro¯les set is compact for the same topology and Fan -
Glicksberg ¯xed point theorem applies to ® £
Qr
i=1 Ri: ¥
33Lemma 9 J n has an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof:
In this part Liapunov's theorem will be fundamental. First, notice that
the payo®s of the atomic players in J n depend on the pro¯le of mixed
strategies (¹h)h only through ¯nitely many e indicators of the form (e =











hdh where Ze 2 L(H;C(Kn))
Secondly, let Eh(p;¼;C) =
Q

















where the integral on the left hand side is the set in I R
e of the all integrals
of the form
R
Kn Zh(µh;'h;Mh)d¹h, for ¹h 2 Eh(p;¼;C). The integral on
the right hand side is de¯ned endogenously. The equality above follows by


























Then, given a mixed strategies equilibrium pro¯le (¹h)h, there exists
(µh;'h;Mh) such that the Dirac measure at (µh;'h;Mh) is an extreme point
of Eh (evaluated at the equilibrium levels of the variables chosen by the
atomic players ) and (µh;'h;Mh)h can replace (¹h)h and keep all equilibrium
conditions satis¯ed, without changing the equilibrium levels of the variables
chosen by the atomic players but replacing the former equilibrium bundles
by dh(µh;'h;Mh) .¥
349.3 Closedness of consumers' choice correspondences
Since p0 2 4L¡1 consumers' budget correspondence always has the origin as
an interior point of its values, implying that the interior of the budget corre-
spondence is lower-semicontinuous and, therefore, the budget correspondence
itself is also lower semi-continuous.
Lemma 10 The budget correspondence is lower semicontinuous .
Proof:
Let Bh(p;q;°;C) be the budget set (of the untruncated economy) and let
Bh
0(p;q;°;C) be its subset where all S + 1 budget constraints hold as strict
inequalities.
Claim 1: Bh(p;q;°;C) is the closure of Bh
0(p;q;°;C)
To prove this claim, let z = (x;µ;';M) 2 Bh(p;q;°;C). We want to ¯nd
a sequence (zn) such that zn 2 Bh
0(p;q;°;C) and zn ! z.
Let zn = (knx;knµ;kn';M) where kn = 1 ¡ 1=n. Let
h0(x;µ;';M) = p0x0 + p0M' ¡ ¼2' + ¼1µ
and hs(x;µ;';M) = psxs ¡ Nsµ ¡ psYsM' + Ds' for s ¸ 1, where
Dsj = minfpsYsM;psRsjg. Now hs(x;µ;';M) = ps$s > 0 for s ¸ 0 and





To see this let xh = 0;µh = 0;'h = 0 and Mh = 0. The values thus
chosen for these variables satisfy the budget constraint of agent h with strict
inequality, as desired.2
Claim 3: Bh
0 is lower semicontinuous.
To prove this claim let limk!1(pk;qk;°k;Ck) = (p;q;°;C) and
(xh;µh;'h;Mh) 2 Bh





































for k large enough, as desired.2.
Then lemma follows from Hildenbrand [15], pag. 26, fact 4.¥
It can also be veri¯ed that budget correspondences of truncated economies
enjoy also the same property. Let us see that choice correspondences of
truncated economies are closed. Consumers' optimal choice correspondences
are closed at any (p;q;°;C) satisfying the assumptions of the previous lemma:
if (pk;qk;°k;Ck) ! (p;q;°;C), zk is an optimal choice of consumer h at
(pk;qk;°k;Ck) and zk ! z, given any z 2 Bh(p;q;°;C), 9(zk) ! z such that
zk 2 Bh(pk;qk;°k;Ck) and zk is not prefered to zk by consumer h, implying,
by continuity of uh that z is an optimal choice at (p;q;°;C).
Comment
Consider an economy where derivative and primitive asset aggregates are
also required to match in value ( but not in quantity) but collateral margin
requirements are bounded from below, say p0Mh
j ¡ ¼2j ¸ ² (or that p0Mh
j ¡
qj ¸ ², as in Araujo, Orrillo and Pascoa (2000)), when 'h
j > 0. Then, the
lower semi-continuity of the budget correspondence holds. In fact, taking
p0 2 4L¡1 and ¼h
2j ´ qj ¡
P
s °s(psRsj ¡ psYsMj)+ (that is, setting the




j ), the constraint p0Mh
j ¡ qj ¸ ² is always well-de¯ned
and admits an interior solution (with Mh
j large enough) which is compatible
with the interior solution (x;µ;') = 0 of the other budget constraints.
9.4 On Necessary Conditions for Utility Maximization
We will examine in this section a ¯rst order necessary condition for utility
maximization in the budget set of the truncated economy. We will address
36only the case when the consumer defaults on an asset in every state as desired
for the proof of Lemma 3 above (to establish that actually it is never optimal
to default in every state, in a large enough truncated economy). In this case,
a constraint quali¯cation holds and a Kuhn-Tucker necessary condition can
be derived.
Lemma 11 For truncated economies En, with n large enough, if a con-
sumer's optimal choice would lead to default on asset j in every state, then
the following Kuhn-Tucker condition on Mj should hold: u0
ol'j · 0 and
u0
ol'jMjl = 0, for every commodity l.
Proof:
Let us modify the problem of maximizing the utility of consumer h in
the budget set Bh
n(pn;¼n
1;qn;°n;Cn;Nn) of the truncated economy by ¯xing
the values of the variables 'k and Mk, k 6= j, to be equal to the respec-
tive truncated equilibrium values 'hn
k and Mhn
k . We will now examine a
constraint quali¯cation that ensures necessity of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
of this modi¯ed maximization problem, with respect to all remaining choice
variables, if the set (Shn
j )
0
were empty at an optimal solution. Notice that in
this case all functions entering the budget constraints become di®erentiable,
with respect to these remaining choice variables, at the optimal choice vector.
We suppose that n is large enough so that pn
s À 0 for every s ¸ 1, which is
possible due to Lemma 2.
Denote by h(z) = 0 the system of S+1 budget constraints in the variables
z = (x;µ;'j;Mj) and denote by g(z) · 0 the system of inequaties given, in
this order, by xs ¸ 0, xs · n1 (s ¸ 1), µ ¸ 0, µ · n1, 'j ¸ 0, 'j · n,
Mj ¸ 0, Mj · n1, x0 ¸ 0 and x0 + M' · n1 (where 'k and Mk for k 6= j
are set equal to 'hn
k and Mhn
k , respectively.).
Let us check that the Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint quali¯cation
(also known as the modi¯ed Arrow-Hurwicz-Uzawa condition, see Mangasar-
ian (1994) 11.3.5), holds at a vector z for which (Shn
j )0 =;. We have to show
that rh(z) has full row rank and that the system constituted by rgI(z)z > 0
together with rh(z)z = 0 has a solution z 2 <a, where a = L(S+1)+J+1+L
and I = fi : gi(z) = 0g.
37First, notice that rxh(z) has full row rank since (rxshs(z))S
s=1 is block
diagonal and nonsingular (by lemma 3).
Secondly, rgI(z)z > 0 is equivalent to (i) ¡zi > 0 if zi = 0, (ii) zi > 0
if zi = n (both (i) and (ii) for zi equal to xsl,µk,'j or Mj), (iii) ¡x0l > 0 if
x0l = 0 and (iv) x0l + Mj'j + Mj'j > 0 if x0l + Ml' = n. Let us start by
trying to make rhs(z)z = 0 for s ¸ 1 and let y be such that z = (xs;y).
(a) If ryhs(z)y · 0 let xs be such that psxs = ¡ryhs(z)y ¸ 0 which is
possible since xs does not need to have negative components, as xs > 0.
(b) If ryhs(z)y > 0, that is, if psYsx0 + Nsµ < 0, then µk < n for some k
or x0l < n for some l.
(b1) When µ = 0 and x0 = 0, let xs be such that psxs = ¡ryhs(z)y < 0
which is possible since for some commodity l we can make xsl negative be-
cause xsl can not be equal to n for every l. Otherwise, hs(z) = 0 implies n ·
ps$s +
P
k6=j psYsMk'k · maxl $sl + npsYs, that is, psYs ¸ 1 ¡ maxl $sl=n
which can not hold for n large due to lemma 2 and since Ys < 1.
(b2) When µk > 0 for some k or x0l > 0 for some l, then the respective
variable µk or x0l can be chosen positive and large so that psYsx0 + Nsµ ¸ 0
and (b) does not occur, in any state s.
Finally, let us make rh0(z)z = 0, or equivalently, p0x0 + b ¼j'j +¼1µ = 0,





If b ¼j'j + ¼1µ ¸ 0 let x0 be such that p0x0 = ¡(b ¼j'j + ¼1µ) · 0, by
choosing x0l < 0 for at least one commodity l. Even when x0l+Ml' = n, the
requirement x0l + Mj'j + Mj'j > 0 can be ful¯lled by making Mjl positive
and large enough.
The case b ¼j'j +¼1µ < 0 can be avoided when µk > 0 for some k or b ¼j > 0
( by making µk or 'j positive and large enough) and can be dealt with easily
when x0l > 0 for some l (by making x0l positive and large enough). Suppose
x0 = 0, µ = 0 and b ¼j · 0, which implies µ ¿ 0, x0 ¿ 0 and Mjl'j = n for ev-
















large enough, contradicting a feasibility condition that must hold at an equi-
librium for the truncated economy.
We have shown that the Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint quali¯ca-
tion of the utility maximization problem with 'k and Mk, k 6= j, ¯xed
at the respective truncated equilibrium values 'hn
k and Mhn
k is satis¯ed when
(Shn
j )0 = ; at an optimal solution. The necessity of the Kuhn-Tucker con-
dition follows from Proposition 11.3.6 in Mangasarian (1994).
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